### Ptx

#### a.) Uniqueness and internal link – CIR will pass – but bipartisanship is key to effective compromise

AP 7/8/13 (“Congress Is Back: Here's What's on the Bickering Agenda”, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/100871129>, CMR)

In the GOP-controlled House, courteous behavior, even within the majority ranks, has barely been perceptible with the ignominious failure of the farm bill. Some collaboration will be necessary if the House is to move ahead on immigration legislation this month.¶ Conservatives from safe, gerrymandered House districts have rebuffed appeals from some national Republicans who argue that embracing immigration overhaul will boost the party's political standing with an increasingly diverse electorate, especially in the 2016 presidential election. Those conservatives strongly oppose any legislation offering citizenship to immigrants living here illegally.¶ Reflecting the will of the rank and file, House Speaker John Boehner of Ohio and other Republicans have said the comprehensive Senate immigration bill that couples the promise of citizenship for those living here unlawfully with increased border security is a nonstarter in the House.¶ Opening the Senate session on Monday, Reid urged the House to consider the Senate bill—a highly unlikely step.¶ "Now it's our duty to convince our colleagues in the House, yes, they should vote with us," he said. "Bipartisan immigration reform that includes a pathway to citizenship makes economic and political sense."¶ House Republicans were assessing the views of their constituents during the weeklong July 4th break and planned to discuss their next steps at a private meeting Wednesday.¶ Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, said Republicans would be hashing out "two key hot spots" in the meeting: the pathway to citizenship and health care.¶ "We need to be the party of solutions and not always obstructing, and so I think there's an effort here that we ... need to fix this immigration system," McCaul said Sunday on CBS' "Face the Nation." He predicted that the full House could take up immigration as early as this month, and that representatives from both chambers could be working to resolve differences in their versions late this year or early next.¶ The House Judiciary Committee has adopted a piecemeal approach, approving a series of bills, none with a path to citizenship that Obama and Democrats are seeking. Democrats hope the single-issue bills get them to a conference with the Senate, where the prospects for a far-reaching overhaul improve.¶ "I think what you're finding is that there will be a compromise, a smart compromise," Rep. Xavier Becerra, D-Calif., said Sunday, also on CBS. "You have to be smart. You have to be tough. But you have to be fair. And if you can do that, you'll have a full fix."

#### b.) Link – Powerful sugar lobby hates economic engagement with cuba

**Knapp, 9**

Thomas L. Knapp, Senior News Analyst and Media Coordinator at the Center for c4ss.org, 11/2/9, http://c4ss.org/content/1369

Case in point: The US trade embargo on Cuba. For going on 50 years now, the rights and welfare of both Cubans and Americans have taken second place to the alleged desire of the US government to topple Fidel Castro’s communist regime. I say “alleged,” because the real purpose of the embargo from the US standpoint certainly isn’t to “protect” the US from Cuba, which hasn’t represented a significant military threat since the Soviet Union blinked first in the “missile crisis” of the early 1960s. Nor is it to bring down Castro, whose regime has benefited immensely from it. Rather**, its real purpose is to pump anti-Castro Cuban-Americans** in Florida — **held in sway by an “anti-Castro dissident industry”** whose principals are far more interested in **amassing wealth and influence in the US** than in actually liberating Cuba — **and subsidy-seeking sugar producers (who don’t want to have to compete with Cuban sugar imports) for campaign money and November votes**. And while Castro’s regime and that of his successor, his brother Raul, have always talked a good anti-embargo game, they’re Johnny on the spot and ready to escalate tensions with the US any time it looks like the matter is up for serious reconsideration. From their standpoint, El Bloqueo may be the single best guarantee of their continued hold on power. It gives them a ready-made foreign enemy — an enemy to blame for the failure of Castro’s socialist revolution and an enemy to wave at its subjects as a military threat against which those subjects must stand united. What would be the result of an end to the embargo — assuming, as it is never safe to do, that both governments were actually willing to drop it into the wastebasket of history? **On the economic side**, consumers and non-rent-seeking producers in both countries would benefit. **Sugar in particular would get cheaper in the US as American producers were forced to compete** in an open market **instead of being “protected” from Cuban cane**. Goods of all types would get cheaper in Cuba as American imports which only have to be shipped across 90 miles of ocean arrive to compete with their European equivalents. Producers in both countries would have new markets opened to them, and capital from both countries would have new, competitive places to flow to. **On the political side**, citizens of both countries would regain at least some freedoms their governments have denied them. Freedom to travel. Freedom to trade. Freedom to engage with each other. Only the two regimes would lose, and the things they’d lose — opportunities to indulge in control and corruption — are things they were never rightfully entitled to in the first place. **The beneficiaries** of the embargo **are the politicians** of both governments **and their rent-seeking paymasters**. The rest of us take it right on the chin. To understand any government policy, ask the question the Romans asked when looking into lesser criminal matters: “cui bono” (“who benefits”). The actions of the ruling class are seldom undertaken for the benefit of the ruled.

#### Major shifts in policy towards Latin America cause partisan battles

Whitehead & Nolte 12 (Laurence Whitehead, senior research fellow in politics at Nuffield College, Oxford, and Detlef Nolte, acting president of the GIGA, director of the GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies, professor of political science at the University of Hamburg, Number 6, 2012, <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1206.pdf>, CMR)

US–Latin America relations are routinely managed by multiple bureaucratic agencies, which can act quite autonomously and are often not coordinated via a common ¶ strategy. Obama’s Latin America policy has frequently been hampered by political ¶ polarization and partisan divisions in Congress. „ The intermestic dimension of US–Latin American relations has complicated foreign ¶ policy, because a more self-confident and autonomous majority in Latin America ¶ has sometimes sought a policy shift with regard to highly sensitive topics, such as ¶ drugs, immigration and Cuba.¶ „ One issue area where some would criticize the Obama administration is its slowness ¶ in improving relations with Brazil or placing Brazil on par with, for example, India.¶ „ It is unlikely that Latin America’s modest ranking in US foreign policy will increase ¶ or that Washington’s priorities will shift much after the November 2012 elections.

#### c.) Impact – CIR is key to the economy and competitiveness

Green 7/2 - founder and president of FWD.us, an advocacy group created by technology leaders that promotes policies to keep the United States and its citizens competitive in a global economy (Joe, “House, knowledge economy needs immigrants”, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/opinion/green-immigration-reform/index.html>, CMR)

Our country has changed a lot during those 27 years, but not -- so far -- our immigration policy. Suffice it to say, if we can pass our generation's immigration reform, it will be a really big deal.¶ America's greatest asset has always been its people, drawn here from all over the world. In the 21st century, our economic future depends on immigrants more than ever. The fastest-growing sector of our economy is the knowledge economy, where the main competitive difference is people.¶ In a globalized world where people and businesses have their choice of countries to locate in, continuing to have the best trained, hardest-working and most productive people in the world will keep the United States at the forefront of global competitiveness. We have some huge advantages: the top universities in the world, the top scientific researchers, and -- right alongside these -- our identity as a nation of immigrants and descendants of immigrants.¶ At FWD.us, a nonprofit advocacy group, we are entrepreneurs, and we believe that one of the main reasons America is the leading entrepreneurial nation is that we are a nation of immigrants. Leaving behind your home country and everything you know to create a better life for your family is the essence of the risk-taking that characterizes the entrepreneurial ethos.¶ I think back to my ancestors in the shtetls of Eastern Europe in the 19th century. They had probably never been more than two miles from their village, and got on a steamship to go to a country they had never even seen in a picture, knowing they would never return home.¶ That is truly putting it all on the line to make a better life. It is not random, who chooses to emigrate, and the work ethic and entrepreneurial spirit of these immigrants have shaped the character of our country. Entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley do not just identify with the experience of computer programmers coming to America to work at tech companies, but with everyone who comes here to make a better life. It's why we are working for comprehensive immigration reform.¶ There are talented young people in America who were brought here by their parents who now cannot go to college or work because they are undocumented. These DREAMers are just waiting to contribute, and their parents, with the right accountability measures, should be able to join them by coming out of the shadows and contributing fully to their communities.¶ In addition, we know that the best and the brightest come here to study, start companies and create jobs that grow our economy; millions more are caught in limbo navigating a complex and broken system that is totally outdated for a modern economy and modern American families. We need to pass comprehensive immigration reform to unlock those contributions and by doing so change millions of lives.

#### d.) Collapse of the US economic power causes nuclear war

Khalilzad 11 Zalmay was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, “ The Economy and National Security”, 2-8-11, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/259024>, CMR

Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.

### Brazil

#### Uniqueness – US Brazil Relations at crossroads

**Bodman and Wolfensohn, Chairs Independent Task Force CFR, 2011**

(Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director

“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Independent Task Force Report No. 66 CAIO accessed tm 7/9)

Brazil and the United States are now entering a period that has¶ great potential to solidify a mature friendship, one that entails everdeepening¶ trust in order to secure mutual benefits. This kind of relationship¶ requires the two countries to move beyond their historic¶ oscillation between misinterpretation, public praise, and rebuke, and¶ instead approach both cooperation and inevitable disagreement with¶ mutual respect and tolerance.

#### Link – unilateral action in the region by the US harms relations

**Meiman, 2009**

(Kellie, “The Possibility of Partnership”, Center for American Progress, March, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

The combination of Brazil’s clear emergence on the world stage and the United States’ need to reassert itself as a multilateralist creates potential to forge a partnership born of ¶ overlapping interests. This is a moment when both Brazil and the United States need to ¶ prove themselves. Brazil needs to show that it is prepared to make hard decisions tied to ¶ the role of global stakeholder, as it has done in Haiti by maintaining a critical peacekeeping presence in the troubled Caribbean nation. And the United States must show that the era of U.S. unilateralism is over. Today, Brazil is more outward looking from a diplomatic and business perspective than at any point in its history, and would make a beneficial partner for the United States as we confront the next four years. To bear fruit, however, the relationship must be built on a positive, well-coordinated agenda, not as a reaction to difficult regional and global circumstances. Active maintenance of this initiative must come from the highest levels of both governments, without sacrificing the autonomy of each country’s foreign policy. Even though Brazil will not agree with the United States on every issue, it is in the United States’ interest to forge a cooperative, bilateral relationship. Brazil has much to contribute in regard to integrating emerging powers and technologies into international frameworks, as well as an active interest in growing its global stakeholder role. Brazil should be encouraged to seize this mantle in a meaningful way.¶

#### C internal link and impact – US Brazil relations key to solving myriad of problems – promoting free markets, ensuring security, countering China and countering regional problems

Kurtz, The Daily Northwestern Columnist, 2013, Michael, “Kurtz: U.S.-Brazil relations show it takes two to samba”, The Daily NorthWestern, February 20, 2013, <http://dailynorthwestern.com/2013/02/20/opinion/kurtz-u-s-brazil-relation-show-it-takes-two-to-samba/>, 7/10/13, JG

These issues are all certainly worthy of conversation. However, when the world beyond our shores is discussed in this country, one hears nary a mention of Latin America — nor, more specifically, its most powerful nation, Brazil, which recently surpassed the United Kingdom to become the world’s sixth-largest economy. Should this blase attitude continue to seize the policy-makers and thought leaders of the future, the U.S. could miss out on what could be one of the most valuable and mutually beneficial international relationships of this century.¶ Self-interest should provide plenty of opportunities for bilateral cooperation, as Congressional Research Service reports show that Brazil could soon become one of the world’s five biggest oil and gas producers. This boost — coupled with enormous American demand (it remains the world’s biggest consumer) — means the US will likely import much more Brazilian oil in the coming decades.¶ The benefits of drawing more heavily on Brazilian oil supplies would include decreasing dependence on unreliable allies such as Saudi Arabia, counterbalancing China’s increasing involvement in a traditionally American sphere of influence and securing a constant source of energy while fracking and oil-sand extraction approach full technological maturity.¶ There is definitely room for improvement. Brazil is only our 10th biggest supplier, even though it is a stable democracy with enormous offshore oil reserves that could contain as many as 123 billion barrels, more than twice the number estimated in previous government reports.¶ Brazil could, in return, negotiate for improved U.S. funding for counternarcotic operations in the dangerous tri-border region it shares with Argentina and Paraguay, more counterterrorism support ahead of both the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, or even a seat on the United Nations Security Council.¶ The latter is of particular interest to Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff. This prospect has given President Barack Obama pause, however, given that Rousseff’s predecessor Lula da Silva failed to back him in pressuring Cuba on human rights or levying sanctions on Iran.¶ The absence of a consistent, long-term Brazilian orientation on international issues that matter to the U.S. — in contrast to steadfast support from allies like Canada and Great Britain — worries policymakers in Washington. There are small signs of hope, however. The countries are considering mutual visa waivers, the 112th Congress lifted tariffs on imported ethanol and both Obama and Rousseff have done away with protectionist barriers on products such as American whiskey and Cachaca, a Brazilian liquor.¶ The U.S. and Brazil must work together, not only out of self-interest, but also to advance free markets and marginalize the region’s dictatorial thugs and fiery leftist provocateurs.

### Case

#### WAR Great-power nuclear war’s possible

**Wittner 11** Lawrence Wittner is Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?" 11/30/2011 [www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china\_b\_1116556.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a dangerthat **they will be used**. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing **their deadliest weapons**. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

#### Prefer specific scenarios - even if things make war more difficult it doesn’t make it unthinkable

James Wood Forsyth, Professor, National Security Studies and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs, National War College, "Through the Glass Darkly: The Unlikely Demise of Great-Power War," STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY, Fall 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509123

The United States cannot prepare to put down any and all potential rivals. The costs of such an undertaking would quickly prove to be enormous, especially when domestic spending on programs like social security and Medicare are factored into the security equation. Over the long haul rivals will emerge, and there is little the United States can do except balance against them, as they will prepare to balance against us. In such a world, where states compete for power, one must be concerned with survival. That being the case, it is worth remembering that the most serious threats to the great powers have historically stemmed from other great powers. In the years ahead, as strong challengers emerge, conflicts will arise, making war among the great powers more, not less, likely. 49 Contrary to popular belief, we are not living in a whole new world. The events of September 11 and the wars that have followed have had a pronounced effect on US foreign and defense policy, but they have not done away with the state system. The world is still made up of states that must look out for themselves. To pretend otherwise is to neglect history or to fall prey to presentism—something common among pundits but dangerous for statesmen and men and women of the armed forces. Historically, the most efficient and effective way to ensure state security is through military means. Thus, the importance of the balance of power, which exists to prevent one great power from dominating the rest, has not diminished. Instead, it has been reinvigorated as states are reminded of the need to defend themselves. The implications of acknowledging the possibility of a great-power war are easier to grasp than to implement. Despite the urgency of the war in Iraq, we need to think seriously about what a great-power war would look like, how it could occur and be prevented, and how it would be fought so that we can gain some understanding about the equipment and forces needed to fight and win. The groundwork for the technologies needed for such a contest needs to be laid today. The difficulties in putting armor on vehicles for Iraq pale in comparison to creating the lead time and resources needed to fight a great-power war. Failing to do so risks lives and jeopardizes US security goals. This does not mean that we should ignore current threats or overlook the need to relieve misery and suffering around the world, what one strategist terms “minding the gap.” 50 As citizens, we should be concerned with the political and human consequences of poverty, ecological degradation, and population growth. We must also fully address the problem of terrorism. But as real as the consequences of poverty, ecological degradation, population growth, and terrorism might be, it is hard to come up with a realistic scenario involving these tragedies that would alter the balance of power. 51 Put simply, in an age of transformation, we cannot neglect the basics. Should the United States find itself in another great-power war, things that are taken for granted today, like air superiority or control of sea lanes, might come up short tomorrow. That technology, economics, democracy, and norms play a role in preventing great-power war is not the issue. The issue is whether they make it unthinkable. Regrettably, they do not, and because they do not, great-power war has a bright future, however tragic that might seem.

#### Most recent evidence proves nuclear winter causes extinction

Starr 12 [Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,” <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/>]

In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke. This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block most sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth . The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict 40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death. A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be a mass extinction event that would wipe out many animals living at the top of the food chains - including human beings.

#### Nuclear war will escalate --- restraint would invite aggression

Dennis Ray **Morgan 9**, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693

And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of **a few minutes**, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a **rapid escalation** of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually **less probable** since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In otherwords, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be **the signal** for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek selfdetermination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely thatmany, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

### K

**The affirmative’s depiction of Latin America identifies the US acting upon a passive country framed around depictions of poor economics, drugs, or chaos. This threatening frame secures a violent relationship between the actors**

**Taylor 2013** [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

I want to argue that Latin America is invisible to IR, and that taking the region seriously unsettles the discipline in two key ways, especially if we embrace an explicitly Latin American postcolonial perspective. Firstly, it places early colonial and slave experiences at the heart of international relationships. This questions IR’s enduring emphasis on state sovereignty and inter-state war by foregrounding what I call inter-polity relationships and recognising inter-polity struggles. Secondly, reading IR through Latin America – from the south-side up – gives us a different perspective on the USA, one which reveals its coloniality in the past, and (more importantly) in the present. I argue that the very special relationship between Latin America and the USA, so often understood as being simply imperialistic, might be thought of as a complex mix in which Latin America is both different and the same, both ‘other’ and ‘akin’. Recognizing this complex relationship opens new ways of thinking about the region – and international relations. ¶ It is intriguing that International Relations hardly talks about Latin America at all – be it conventional IR or indeed more postie or constructivist approaches[[1]](#footnote-1). Most coverage of the region is about the United States doing something to or in Latin America and such activities are framed either as a ‘legitimate security concerns’, or as reflecting a barely concealed imperialism. The contextual or historical work focuses on US interventions (such as Chile, Guatemala or Nicaragua) and Latin America is deployed in cautionary tales about issues such as economic instability, political corruption, violent societies and the drugs trade. Latin Americans also become international actors if they are migrants, but only if they attempt to set foot on US soil. These issues are mostly dealt with as being US foreign policy concerns and the impact on Latin Americans themselves is seldom considered. This emphasis on US actions and its foreign policy anxieties is on one level very understandable, given the prominence of the USA in global politics and its unerring assumption that it holds the position as regional leader. It is also perhaps explained by the dominance of US scholarship in IR more generally, and of US scholarship about Latin America in particular – this is their intellectual backyard as much as their geopolitical one[[2]](#footnote-2). Especially for conventional approaches to IR, Latin America’s importance lies in its position on the Whitehouse or CIA agenda and as such, it is mostly seen as a place of threat (or pity), as a caricature of barbaric danger, characterised by violence, terror, economic chaos, and drugs. ¶ In this way, Latin America is portrayed as a passive recipient of US actions, or if it is an agent, it is a dangerous one. The region is unnervingly dangerous because its threats are under-hand and not inter-state wars - one of the curious characteristics of the region is that remarkably few inter-state wars have taken place over the last 200 years. This renders Latin America invisible as an agent (because making wars or peace is a key-sign of agency for IR) yet visible as a shadowy, menacing presence. The region is therefore a place to be known about because it was feared, not as a place to warrant investigation on its own terms, a source of policy solutions or where significant and different knowledge might be generated. It seems that bad economics, corruption and demagoguery is what IR – or at least the conventional sort – is pre-programmed to take notice of. This makes it impossible for IR to ‘see’ Latin America, which in turn undermines its claim to make sense of the world.

**The modus operandi of the affirmative’s economics is the historical drive behind colonization and mass violence against latin America culminating in wars, violence and genocide in the name of their economic ideals**

**Escobar 2004** [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎

One of the main consequences, for Santos, of the collapse of emancipation into regulation is the structural predominance of exclusion over inclusion. Either because of the exclusion of many of those formerly included, or because those who in the past were candidates for inclusion are now prevented from being so, the problematic of exclusion has become terribly accentuated, with ever growing numbers of people thrown into a veritable “state of nature.” The size of the excluded class varies of course with the centrality of the country in the world system, but it is particularly staggering in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The result is a new type of social fascism as “a social and civilizational regime” (p. 453). This regime, paradoxically, coexists with democratic societies, hence its novelty. This fascism may operate in various modes: in terms of spatial exclusion; territories struggled over by armed actors; the fascism of insecurity; and of course the deadly financial fascism, which at times dictates the marginalization of entire regions and countries that do not fulfill the conditions needed for capital, according to the IMF and its faithful management consultants (pp. 447-458). To the former Third World corresponds the highest levels of social fascism of these kinds. This is, in sum, the world that is being created by globalization from above, or hegemonic globalization.¶ Before moving on, it is important to complete this rough representation of today’s global capitalist modernity by looking at the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Among other things, this episode has made at last two things particularly clear: first, the willingness to use unprecedented levels of violence to enforce dominance on a global scale; second, the unipolarity of the current empire. In ascension since the Thatcher-Reagan years, this unipolarity reached its climax with the post-9/11 regime, based on a new convergence of military, economic, political and religious interests in the United States. In Alain Joxe’s (2002) compelling vision of imperial globality, what we have been witnessing since the first Gulf War is the rise of an empire that increasingly operates through the management of asymmetrical and spatialized violence, territorial control, sub-contracted massacres, and “cruel little wars,” all of which are aimed at imposing the neo-liberal capitalist project. At stake is a type of regulation that operates through the creation of a new horizon of global violence. This empire regulates disorder through financial and military means, pushing chaos to the extent possible to the outskirts of empire, creating a “predatory” peace to the benefit of a global noble caste and leaving untold poverty and suffering in its path. It is an empire that does not take responsibility for the wellbeing of those over whom it rules. As Joxe puts it: “The world today is united by a new form of chaos, an imperial chaos, dominated by the imperium of the United States, though not controlled by it. We lack the words to describe this new system, while being surrounded by its images. ... World leadership through chaos, a doctrine that a rational European school would have difficulty imagining, necessarily leads to weakening states –even in the United States—through the emerging *sovereignty* of corporations and markets.” (2002: 78, 213).¶ 7¶ The new empire thus operates not so much through conquest, but through the imposition of norms (free-markets, US-style democracy and cultural notions of consumption, and so forth). The former Third World is, above all, the theatre of a multiplicity of cruel little wars which, rather than barbaric throwbacks, are linked to the current global logic. From Colombia and Central America to Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East these wars take place within states or regions, without threatening empire but fostering conditions favorable to it. For much of the former Third World (and of course to the Third World within the core) is reserved “the World-chaos” (107), free-market slavery, and selective genocide. In some cases, this amounts to a sort of “paleo-micro- colonialism” within regions (157), in others to balkanization, in yet others to brutal internal wars and massive displacement to free up entire regions for transnational capital (particularly in the case of oil, but also diamonds, timber, water, genetic resources, and agricultural lands). Often times these cruel little wars are fueled by Mafia networks, and intended for macro-economic globalization. It is clear that this new Global Empire (“the New World Order of the American imperial monarchy,” p. 171) articulates the “peaceful expansion” of the free-market economy with omnipresent violence in a novel regime of economic and military globality –in other words, the global economy comes to be supported by a global organization of violence and vice versa (200). On the subjective side, what increasingly one finds in the Souths (including the South within the North) are “diced identities” and the transformation of cultures of solidarity into cultures of destruction.

**The logic of the affirmative must be refused. it predetermines the value of existence according to western knowledge and productivity, all that fall short are discardable populations readied for extermination**

**Santos 2004** [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

Finally, the fifth logic of nonexistence is the logic of productivity. It resides in the monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity and efficiency, which privileges growth through market forces. This criterion applies both to nature and to human labor. Productive nature is nature at its maximum fertility in a given production cycle, whereas productive labor is labor that maximizes generating profit likewise in a given production cycle. In its extreme version of conservative utopia neoliberalism aims to convert labor into a productive force among others, subject to the laws of the market as any other productive force. It has been doing this by transforming labor into a global resource while at the same time preventing at any cost the emergence of a global labor market (via immigration laws, violation of labor standards, union busting, etc.) According to the logic of capitalist productivity, nonexistence is produced in the form of nonproductiveness. Applied to nature, nonproductiveness is sterility; applied to labor, “discardable populations”, laziness, professional disqualification, lack of skills.¶ There are thus five principal social forms of nonexistence produced by hegemonic epistemology and rationality: the ignorant, the residual, the inferior, the local, and the nonproductive. They are social forms of nonexistence because the realities to which they give shape are present only as obstacles vis-à-vis the realities deemed relevant, be they scientific, advanced, superior, global, or productive realities. They are, therefore, disqualified parts of homogeneous totalities, which, as such, merely confirm what exists, and precisely as it exists. They are what exist under irretrievably disqualified forms of existing.

**Our alternative is to refuse the logic of neoliberal expansion. This is a fracturing of the logic of economic singularity of neoliberal expansion by recognizing the possibility for other forms of noncapitalist economy – this refusal is competitive as it substantiates a material rejection of US economic inevitability onto the rest of the world**

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t he ecology of productivities. Finally, in the domain of the fifth logic, the monoculture of capitalist productivity, the sociology of absences consists in recuperating and valorizing alternative systems of production, popular economic organizations, workers’ cooperatives, self-managed enterprises, solidarity economy, etc., which have been hidden or discredited by the capitalist orthodoxy of productivity. This is perhaps the most controversial domain of the sociology of absences, for it confronts directly both the paradigm of development and infinite economic growth and the logic of the primacy of the objectives of accumulation over the objectives of distribution that sustain global capitalism. Peasant movements for access to land, land tenure, agrarian reform or against mega-development projects, urban movements for housing rights, informal economy and popular economy movements, indigenous movements to defend or to regain their historical territories and the natural resources found in them, low caste movements in India to protect their land and local forests, all these movements base their claims and their struggles on the ecology of productivities.¶ In each of the five domains, the objective of the sociology of absences is to disclose and to give credit to the diversity and multiplicity of social practices and confer credit to them in opposition to the exclusive credibility of hegemonic practices. The idea of multiplicity and nondestructive relations is suggested by the concept of ecology: ecology of knowledges, ecology of temporalities, ecology of recognitions, ecology of transcales, and ecology of productivities. Common to all these ecologies is the idea that reality cannot be reduced to what exists. It amounts to an ample version of realism that includes the realities rendered absent by silence, suppression, and marginalization. In a word, realities that are actively produced as nonexistent.¶ In conclusion, the exercise of the sociology of absences is counterfactual and takes place by confronting conventional scientific commonsense. To be carried out it demands, both epistemological imagination and democratic imagination. Epistemological imagination allows for the recognition of different knowledges, perspectives and scales of identification, analysis and evaluation of practices. Democratic imagination allows for the recognition of different practices and social agents. Both the epistemological and the democratic imagination have a deconstructive and a reconstructive dimension. Deconstruction assumes five forms, corresponding to the critique of the five logics of hegemonic rationality, namely un-thinking, de-residualizing, de- racializing, de-localizing, and de-producing. Reconstruction is comprised of the five ecologies mentioned above.

1. I have developed these arguments in much greater depth in a draft article submitted to the Review of International Studies “Seeing Latin America: coloniality and the politics of representation in IR”. For the discussant: during that study, I consulted around thirty textbooks focused on a range of topics and aimed at various levels. Of especial relevance were: John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics, 4 ed.,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Antony Best, Jussi Hanhimäki, Joseph A. Maiolo and Kirsten E. Schulze, *An International History of the Twentieth Century,* (London: Routledge, 2003); Michael E. Brown, (ed.), *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the Twentieth Century,* (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Bruno Bueno de Mesquite, *Principles of International Politics, 2 ed*., (Washington: CQ Press, 2000); Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945,* 7 *ed.,* (London: Longman, 2000); John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); K.H.Holsti, *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis, 7 ed.,* (London: Prentice Hall, 1995); Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformations, 8 ed.,* (Boston: Bedford St Martins, 2001); William Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: an International History since 1900,* 5 *ed.,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard Mansbach and Kirsten Rafferty, *Introduction to Global Politics,* (London: Routledge, 2007); Anthony McGrew and Paul Lewis, *Global Politics,* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992); Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, *World Politics: the Menu for Choice, 7 ed.,* (London: Wadsworth, 2004); Trevor Salmon and Mark Imber, (eds.), *Issues in International Relations, 2 ed.,* (London: Routledge, 2008); Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: a Critical Introduction,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000); Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, *International Relations: The Basics,* (London: Routledge, 2007); Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, Kauppi, *IR and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 2 ed.,* (London: Prentice Hall, 2001); Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brian White, Richard Little and Michael Smith, (eds.), *Issues in World Politics,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); John Young and John Kent, *International Relations since 1945: a Global History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). I also made a closer reading of the following more critical texts: J. Marsall Beier, *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair, *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race and Gender,* (London: Routledge, 2004); Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South Relations,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Jenny Edkins and Maya Zehfuss, *Global Politics,* (London: Routledge, 2009; Jim George *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Re-Introduction to International Relations,* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1994); Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference,* (London: Routledge, 2003); Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand and Ricardo D. Salvatore, (eds.), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Sankaran Krishna, *Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century,* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); L.M.H. Ling, *Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Karena Shaw, *Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political,* (London: Routledge, 2008); David Slater, *Geopolitics and the Post-colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, 3 ed,.* (London: Routledge, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Arlene Tickner, ‘Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies’, *International Studies Perspectives*, vol.4, no.4, (2003) pp.325-50. Her large research project confirms the dominance of Western IR: Arlene B. Tickner, ‘Latin America: Still policy dependent after all these years?’, in Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever, (eds), *International Relations Scholarship Around the World,* (London: Routledge, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)